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Lugo-Sanchez: Do Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act as Applied to Puert

NOTE
DO AMENDMENTS TO THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT AS APPLIED TO PUERTO RICO
IMPLICITLY ENCOURAGE EMPLOYERS TO
BENEFIT AT THE EXPENSE OF
YOUNG WORKERS?
With something of this scale, we're not just seeing an outage. We
are seeing a complete stoppage in the rhythms of daily life.
- Miguel Romin, Scientist at NASA'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The rhythms of the Puerto Rican daily life were stalled long before
the fire at the aging Aguirre power plant in Salinas, Puerto Rico.2 Since
the early 2000s, Puerto Rico has been facing a recession,' which has
caused many Puerto Ricans to move to the United States.' The influx of
migration has caused Puerto Rico's labor force to decrease.' A report
published by the Institute of Statistics of Puerto Rico shows that, in

1. See Puerto Rico Goes Dark, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY, http://earthobservatory
.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=88796 (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
2. See infra Part II. On September 21, 2016, a fire at a power plant in the south of Puerto
Rico left almost 1.5 million customers without electricity for almost forty-eight hours. Puerto Rico
Goes Dark, supranote 1.
3. Puerto Ricans are American citizens but they lack "any national political representation in
both Houses of Congress" and have no right to vote for the U.S. President if they reside in Puerto
Rico. See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 355 (1st Cir. 2015) (Torruella,
J., concurring), affd, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016); Greg DePersio, The Origins of the Puerto Rican Debt
Crisis, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 23, 2017, 11:35 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/
investing/090915/origins-puerto-rican-debt-crisis.asp (explaining that the Jones-Shafroth Act of
1917 granted United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans).
4.

Jens Manuel Krogstad, Puerto Ricans Leave in Record Numbers for Mainland U.S., PEW

RES. CTR. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/14/puerto-ricans-leavein-record-numbers-for-mainland-u-s (finding that, as of 2013, there were 5.1 million Puerto Ricans

living in the United States mainland compared to 3.5 million living in Puerto Rico, and in 2014
alone, Puerto Rico's net population decreased by 64,000); see Nick Timiraos, Puerto Rico's
Economic Crisis in Five Charts, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016, 1:53 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
economics/2016/06/29/puerto-ricos-economic-crisis-in-five-charts.
5. Timiraos, supra note 4 (noting that the labor force has decreased approximately 20%).
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2012, about 84% of men and 67% of women stated that their main
reason for moving to the United States was job-related.6 These findings
are not unexpected considering that approximately 46% of Puerto Ricans
live below the poverty line. As a result, labor participation is
roughly 40%.'

Currently, Puerto Rico faces debt of nearly $72 billion,9 combined
with "a 15.4 percent unemployment rate, a soaring cost of living,
pervasive crime, crumbling schools and a worrisome exodus of
professionals and middle-class Puerto Ricans""o who are joining the
diaspora in mainland United States." As a response to these problems,
the former Governor of Puerto Rico, Alejandro Garcia-Padilla, enacted
the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act
("Recovery Act").12 The main purpose of the Recovery Act was to create
an avenue for public corporations to restructure their debt.13 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court decided that the Recovery Act was
unconstitutional. 14 Congress subsequently introduced a bill called the
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability
Act ("PROMESA").

6.

ALBERTO L. VELAZQUEZ-ESTRADA, PERFIL DEL MIGRANTE: 2013, 22 (2015) (analyzing

the percentage of men and women who identified "looking for work" as their reason to migrate to
the United States).
7. See Robert Doar, How to Get PuertoRico Back to Work, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 29,

2016), https://www.aei.org/publication/how-to-get-puerto-rico-back-to-work

(quoting Percent of
-

People Below Poverty Level in the Past 12 Months (For Whom Poverty Status Is Determined)
United States -- States; and Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/

faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_ 15_ YRGCT1701.USO1PR&prodType
--table (last visited Aug. 1, 2017)).
8. See Timiraos, supra note 4 (comparing Puerto Rico's labor participation rate to that of the
United States where labor participation totals 63%); see, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Life on the
Precipice in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2016, at BUI (noting that there are only "two

pediatric heart surgeons in Puerto Rico[,]" only "one pediatric anesthesiologist on the whole island,
serving a population of about 900,000 people under 18[,]" and 180 surgeons, "for a population of
about 3.5 million").
9.

See Lizette Alvarez, Economy and Crime Spur New Puerto Rican Exodus, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 9, 2014, at Al; DePersio, supranote 3.
10.

Alvarez, supra note 9, at 1.

11. Id.
12. See infra notes 73, 75 and accompanying text.
13. Recent Legislation, Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal ReorganizationAct - Puerto Rico
Public CorporationDebt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. L.

REv. 1320, 1320-22 (2015) (defining public corporations as those that are government owned and
explaining the reasons behind the enactment of the Recovery Act).
14.

See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.

15.

See H.R. 4900, 114th Cong. (2016).
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PROMESA, Spanish for promise, was enacted to assist Puerto Rico
with its economic crisis and overwhelming debt.16 Although
PROMESA's main focus is related to debt restructuring and financial
oversight it also contains various labor provisions.17 Specifically, section
403 of PROMESA ("section 403") amends the scope of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and its application to Puerto Rican employers
who are subject to federal minimum wage laws." The amendment
strikes paragraphs two through four of section 206(g) of the FLSA. 19
This Note focuses on the amended language of subsection 206(g) of the
FLSA, which changes the scope of the youth subminimum wage as
applied to Puerto Rico.20 Under PROMESA, the Governor of Puerto
Rico can allow employers to pay a subminimum wage that is not less
than $4.25 per hour to employees who are twenty-five years old or
younger and initially hired after June 30, 2016.21 While the enactment of
PROMESA was the last resort for Puerto Rico's economic
shortcomings, the proposed solutions fail to promote social and
employment stability.22 Nothing in PROMESA's legislative history
indicates how increasing the age covered under the federal youth
subminimum wage will benefit the Puerto Rican economy.23 In fact, the
legislative history demonstrates strong opposition to PROMESA's
subminimum wage provision. 24
Part II examines the historical background of the Puerto Rican
economy and provides a detailed description of the events that led to the
economic crisis.25 The purpose of the historical background is to provide
context for the events, both social and economic, that led to the

16. See PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 101, 130 Stat. 549, 553 (2016) (codified at 48
U.S.C. § 2121) ("The purpose of the Oversight Board is to provide a method for a covered territory
to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.").
17. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, §§ 101, 403-404, 130 Stat. 549, 586-587 (codified at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 2121, 2192-93).
18. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g), 130 Stat. 549, 586.
19. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-(4), 130 Stat. at 586.
20. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2), (5)), 130 Stat. at 586 (noting that in the
United States the federal youth subminimum wage only applies to "an employee who has not

attained the age of 20 years, except in the case of the wage applicable in Puerto Rico" it applies to
employees who have not attained the age of twenty years).
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(g)(1) (2012); Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 403, 130 Stat. at 586 (noting
that the period designated by the Governor cannot exceed four years and the designation is "subject
to the approval of the Financial Oversight and Management Board" established by PROMESA).
22.

23.
Congress
W.A.
24.
25.

See infra Part 111.

See 162 CONG. REC. S4653 (daily ed. June 28, 2016) (demonstrating that members of
wanted section 403 to be removed); H.R. REP. No. 114-602, pt. 1, at 51 (2016); infra Part
See infra Part W.A.
See infra Part H.A.
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enactment of PROMESA.2 6 It then examines what compelled the
Governor of Puerto Rico to enact the Recovery Act and the Supreme
Court's determination that the Act was unconstitutional pursuant to the
United States Constitution.2 7 It also discusses the enactment and purpose
of PROMESA. 28 Finally, it details the legislative history of the FLSA
and its historical application to Puerto Rico.29 Part III discusses the legal
and social issues created by the amendments to the FLSA.3 0 It also
explains how the amendments will affect young adults working in Puerto
Rico as well as older workers.31 Further, Part III explores the benefits of
a subminimum wage and how the lack of employer regulation will
encourage the displacement of employees who are on probationary
periods or those who are older.32
Part IV analyzes PROMESA's legislative history, which
demonstrates a strong intent against the enactment of PROMESA's
minimum wage provision.33 Moreover, Part IV recommends
amendments to section 403 and provides concrete regulations and
sanctions for employers who try to take advantage of the subminimum
wage. 34 It then proposes that individuals under the age of twenty-five
who have families or who are full-time college students should be
exempted from the youth subminimum wage. 35 This Note also proposes
that further legislation be enacted to establish regulations for employers
who displace employees after the youth subminimum wage period is
over.36 Part V briefly concludes this Note hoping that the recommended
amendments to section 403 will be adopted, so that Puerto Rican people
under the age of twenty-five do not have to live as a sub-class and those
who are older do not have to fear displacement.37

26. See infra Part H.A-C.
27. See Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws
Act No. 71; infra Part II.B. For a summary of the Recovery Act, see GOv'T DEV. BANK FOR P.R.,
SUMMARY OF THE PUERTO RICO PUBLIC CORPORATION DEBT ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT

6, 18, 34-36 (2014), http://www.gdb-pur.com/documents/SummaryoftheRecoveryAct.pdf.
28. See infra Part I.C.
29. See infra Part I.D.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part M.A.
See infra Part ll.A, C.
See infra Part ]I.B-C.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part IV.A.
infra Part IV.B-C.
infra notes 260-66 and accompanying text.
infra Part IV.C.
infra Part V.
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UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORY BEHIND THE ENACTMENT
OF THE PUERTO Rico OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND
ECONOMIC STABILITY ACT

In order to understand the enactment of PROMESA, it is important
to first understand the history behind it.38 Subpart A provides an
overview of the economic and social history that led to the enactment of
PROMESA and the amendment of the FLSA.39 It focuses on the events
that forced the Governor to pass legislation addressing the debt crisis.40
Moreover, Subpart B explains the purpose of this legislation and the
Supreme Court's ruling that the Recovery Act was unconstitutional.4 1
Subpart C explains the enactment of PROMESA, its purpose, and its
inclusion of various labor provisions.4 2 Subpart D provides a brief
background of the FLSA, its legislative history, and its historical
application to jobs in Puerto Rico. 43 Lastly, Subpart D also explains how
section 403 amends the application of the FLSA with respect to Puerto
Rican employers and employees.44
A.

Social andEconomic Events that Led to the
Enactment ofPROMESA

Puerto Rico has been tremendously affected by its economic
crisis. 45 In the 1990s, the U.S. government established various tax
exemptions for corporations that conducted business in Puerto Rico.46
Naturally, this incentivized corporations to bring their business to Puerto
Rico.47 In 2006, however, these tax exemptions expired,48 which led to a
38. See infra Part I.A-C.
39. See infta Part I.A.
40. See infra Part IIA-B.
41. See infra Part II.B.
42. See infra Part N.C.
43. See infra Part I.D.
44. See infra Part I.D.
45. See Greece in the Caribbean,ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2013, at 14, 18; Matt Rego, Why Is
Puerto Rico in so Much Debt?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 11, 2015, 9:29 AM), http://www.investopedia.
com/articles/investing/111115/why-puerto-rico-so-much-debt.asp (comparing the Puerto Rican
economic crisis to the Greek economic crisis).
46. See Everything You Should Know About Puerto Rico's Debt Crisis, PBS NEWSHOUR
(July 11, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/everything-know-puerto-ricos-debtcnsis.
47. See id (explaining that most of the businesses were major pharmaceutical manufacturers
and that there was a time where about "13 of the top 20 prescription drugs [were] actually made in
Puerto Rico").
48. See Paul Krugman, America's Un-Greek Tragedies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2015, at A19
(attributing Puerto Rico's economic success to the manufacturers who relocated to the Island until
the tax breaks expired in 2006).
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decrease in tax revenue.4 9 In turn, this forced the Puerto Rican
government to increase other taxes.50 To complicate matters further,
Puerto Rico has been facing a loss in population that has been described
as a "slide that is steeper and more financially disastrous than in any
U.S. state since the end of World War II."5 1 As a result, the smaller

population creates less tax revenue.5 2 Interestingly, although the
economy has been deteriorating, consumption per capita has been
increasing. Puerto Rico, however, has not been able to fully recover
and, for more than a decade, it has not been able to balance its budget.5 4
In about ten years, the Puerto Rican government managed to
exponentially increase its debt. 5
Another factor that led to the Puerto Rican debt crisis was the tax
treatment of Puerto Rican municipal bonds.5 6 The tax benefits attracted
creditors and incentivized them to overlook the fiscal problems that
Puerto Rico was experiencing. 57 Municipal bonds are defined as debt
issued by local governments to finance their expenditures.5 ' The Puerto
49. See Mary Williams Walsh & Liz Moyer, How Puerto Rico Debt Is Grapplingwith a Debt
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/dealbook/

puerto-rico-debt-crisis-explained.html?_r-O.
50.

See, e.g., Scott Beyer, Puerto Rico, at 11.5%, Has America's Highest Sales Tax, FORBES

(Aug. 17, 2015, 2:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2015/08/17/puerto-rico-at-I 1-5has-americas-highest-sales-tax/#2eaedf445424 (noting that since the summer of 2015 Puerto Rico
has had the highest sales tax in America, because the Puerto Rican government "raised its Sales and
Use Tax from 7% to 11.5%").
51.

See Nick Timiraos, Exodus Worsens Puerto Rico's Crisis, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2016, at

Al; see also DePersio, supra note 3 (explaining that Puerto Rico's population is not only leaving
the Island, but it is also aging).
52. Walsh & Moyer, supra note 49 (attributing part of Puerto Rico's current debt to the
Island's failure to generate enough revenue).
53. See Krugman, supra note 48 (comparing Puerto Rico's financial situation to that of

Europe and explaining that although Puerto Rico is facing an economic crisis, the Island's
consumption per capita has increased because of continued increases in federal funding).
54. See Beyer, supra note 50 (noting that Puerto Rico has been in a recession since 2006);
Timiraos, supra note 4.

55. See Michelle Kaske & Tatiana Darie, Puerto Rico's Slide, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2016,
3:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/puerto-ricos-slide (noting that the Puerto Rican
government nearly doubled its debt).
56. See Alvarez, supra note 9, at 1; DePersio, supra note 3 (explaining that the Jones-Shafroth
Act of 1917 stipulated that Puerto Rican municipal bonds would be exempted from taxation and
thus residents of the fifty states and other United States territories could invest in these bonds
without having to pay interest on the income); cf Beyer, supra note 50 (imputing part of the

existing debt to the "famously corrupt and inefficient political system that keeps large percentages
of people on the public dole, either through welfare or government employment.").
57. Timiraos, supra note 4.
58. For purposes of this Note, the general definition of municipal bonds is as follows:
Municipal bonds are debt securities issued by states, cities, counties and other
governmental entities to finance capital projects, such as building schools, highways or
sewer systems, and to fund day-to-day obligations. Investors who buy municipal bonds

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/12
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Rican government could issue its municipal bonds tax-exempt, making
these bonds highly attractive to creditors.59 For many years, this tax
exemption was indispensable to the Puerto Rican government. 6 0
Essentially, the government was paying for its expenses with borrowed
money. 61 The Puerto Rican government continues to default on its
debt of over $72 billion,62 despite allocating most of its budget to
"debt service."63
In 2014, several major credit rating agencies rated Puerto Rico's
debt as noninvestment grade.64 The grading is particularly concerning
because Puerto Rico cannot seek any relief under chapter nine of the
Bankruptcy Code.6 ' The rating also matters because it affects Puerto
Rico's access to capital markets.66 With no access to capital markets, 6 7 it
is difficult for Puerto Rico to fund its government and to avoid
defaulting on its debt.68 Currently, there is a possibility that Puerto Rico
will receive further negative grading. 9 This makes it difficult for the
are in effect lending money to the bond issuer in exchange for a promise of regular
interest payments, usually semi-annually, and the return of the original investment, or

"principal." The date when the issuer repays the principal, the bond's maturity date, may
be years in the future.
Municipal Bonds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, (Jan. 28, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/answers/
bondmun.htm.
59. See Timiraos, supra note 4 (explaining that the Puerto Rican government may issue debt
"exempt[ed] from federal, state and local taxes, unlike U.S. states").

60. See DePersio,supra note 3; Rego, supra note 45 (explaining that during the mid-1970s,
20% of Puerto Rico's gross domestic product was allocated to government spending).
61. See Everything You Should Know About Puerto Rico's Debt Crisis, supra note 46
(explaining that, for the last nine to twelve years, Puerto Rico has remained functional by using

borrowed money and that about half of the local government's budget "goes to debt service");
Kaske & Darie, supra note 55 (comparing the practices adopted by the Puerto Rican government to

those adopted by New York City, which caused the city to almost go bankrupt in the 1970s).
62.

See Everything You Should Know About Puerto Rico's Debt Crisis, supranote 46.

63. See id.
64. See DePersio, supranote 3 (noting that this status is also known as "junk status").
65.

See Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Said to Face 'Death Spiral' over Debt, N.Y.

TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2016, at B3 (explaining that Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code allows "distressed
cities and other local governments" to seek financial help).

66. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016) ("Puerto Rico's
access to capital markets has also been severely compromised since ratings agencies downgraded
Puerto Rican bonds ... to noninvestment [grade] . . . .").
67. See What Are Capital Markets? Definition and Meaning, MKT.

http://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/capital-markets

BuS.

(last visited Aug.

NEWS,

1, 2017)

(defining capital markets as "financial markets where long-term debt[s] ... are bought and sold").
68. See CAPITAL WATCH, Puerto Rico's Fiscal Crisis and Its Impact on Capital Markets,

(July 18, 2016), http://cbrecapitalwatch.com/?p-2326 (suggesting that no access to capital markets
will hinder Puerto Rico's ability "to raise funds and keep its government running").
69. See MICROJURIS P.R., Junta de Planificaci6n Presenta Revisidn de Proyecciones
Econdmicas Para Ahos Fiscales 2016 y 2017 [Planning Board Presents Review of Economic

Projectionsfor Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017], (Nov. 11, 2016) (Span.), https://aldia.microjuris.com/
2016/11/1 l/junta-de-planificacion-presenta-revision-de-proyecciones-economicas-para-anos-
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70
Puerto Rican government to avoid subsequent defaults. One of
Congress's aims through PROMESA was to "facilitate reinvestment in
Puerto Rico" and access to capital markets." However, before
PROMESA was enacted, the Puerto Rican government unsuccessfully
attempted to solve its economic crisis.72

B.

PuertoRico Public CorporationDebt Enforcement and
Recovery Act: From Its Inception to Its Decay

The Recovery Act was enacted with the purpose of allowing the
Governor of Puerto Rico to declare a state of emergency and allow
certain public corporations to restructure their debt.73 The combined
deficit for the 2012 to 2013 fiscal year of Puerto Rico's three main
74
public corporations was approximately $20 billion. This combined debt
was one of the main factors that urged former Governor Garcia-Padilla
to pass the Recovery Act.
Mainly, the Recovery Act sought "to establish a debt enforcement,
recovery, and restructuring regime for the public corporations and other
instrumentalities" and afford a remedy for Puerto Rico's lack of
bankruptcy protection.76 For years, Puerto Rican public corporations
have been issuing bonds in the capital markets.77 Neither Puerto Rico

fiscales-2016-y-2017.
70.

See CAPITAL WATCH, supra note 68.

71. See PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 101, 130 Stat. 549, 553 (2016) (codified at 48
U.S.C. § 2121); Puerto Rico Hill Update-Muni Market Impacts, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 18, 2016),
2
20
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Blog/The%2Impact%/ 0f/ Othe
%20Crisis%20on%20Puerto%20Rico%2OMuni%20Market.pdf.
72. The Recovery Act was enacted as an alternative to Chapter 9 relief. See Recent
Legislation, supranote 13, at 1320-23; infra Part Il.B.
73. See Recent Legislation, supra note 13, at 1320; Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico
PassesBill Allowing It to Declare a Moratoriumon Its Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2016, at B5.

74. See 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71; Recent Legislation, supra note 13, at 1321 (identifying
the three main public corporations as "the [Puerto Rico] Electric Power Authority (PREPA), [Puerto
Rico] Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) and the [Puerto Rico] Highways and Transportation
Authority (PRHTA)"); Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Power Supplier Saved from Cash
Squeeze, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at B3 (explaining Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's
debt).
75. See Recent Legislation, supranote 13, at 1321.
76. See 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71 (detailing the regime created by the Recovery Act, which
would be applied during an economic emergency); Andrew M. Simon, Puerto Rico Continues the
Struggle to Restructure Its Debts, NAT'L LAw REviEw (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.
com/article/puerto-rico-continues-struggle-to-restructure-its-debts.

77. See Recent Legislation, supra note 13, at 1321 (explaining that it has been the practice of
Puerto Rico's public corporations to either "issue[] bonds in the capital markets or receive[]
financial support from [the Government Development Bank] to cover budget deficits and fund
capital improvements").
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nor its public corporations can file for federal bankruptcy protection.
Therefore, enacting the Recovery Act seemed to be the only way for the
Puerto Rican government to solve its financial woes.79
But the Recovery Act never met its purpose-creditors sued Puerto
Rico and several government officials, seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of the Recovery Act.so In a pair of consolidated cases under the name
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Puerto Rico,81 Puerto Rico's

District Court held that the Recovery Act was unconstitutional and that
federal bankruptcy law preempted it.82 Shortly thereafter, both the First
Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision.83
In its five to two decision, the Supreme Court focused on the specific
issue of whether Puerto Rico was a state for purposes of preemption.8 4
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, explained:
[T]he definition of "State," . . . has included Puerto Rico since it

became a Territory of the United States in 1898. The first Federal
Bankruptcy Act, also enacted in 1898, defined "States" to include "the
Territories, the Indian Territory, Alaska, and the District of
Columbia.". . . [However], [w]hen Congress recodified the bankruptcy
laws to form the Federal Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the definition of
"State" dropped out of the definitional section.... Congress then
amended the Code to reincorporate the definition of "State" in
1984.... The amended definition includes Puerto Rico as a State for
purposes of the Code with one exception. 85
Justice Thomas stated that the exclusion of Puerto Rico under the
definition of "state" "does not sweep so broadly." 86 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court clarified that Puerto Rico was not considered a state for
purposes of authorizing its municipalities to seek relief under Chapter 9
78. See Michael Corkery, Puerto Rico's Indebted Power Utility Adds to Island's Problems,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2014, at B8.

79. See id.
80. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 (2016) (explaining that
the group of investment funds "hold nearly $2 billion in bonds issued by the [Puerto Rico] Electric
Power Authority").

81. 85 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D.P.R. 2015).
82. Id. at 582, 600-01 (holding that the Recovery Act is unconstitutional "pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution").
83. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. at 1949, af'd, 805 F.3d 322, 332-33 (1st Cir.
2015).
84. 136 S. Ct. at 1942 ("The Federal Bankruptcy Code pre-empts state bankruptcy laws that
enable insolvent municipalities to restructure their debts over the objections of creditors and instead

requires municipalities to restructure such debts under Chapter 9 of the Code.").
85. Id. at 1945.
86. Id. at 1942 (explaining that because of Puerto Rico's exclusion from the definition of
"State," it cannot authorize its municipalities to seek relief under Chapter 9 of the federal
Bankruptcy Code).
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of the Bankruptcy Code, but Puerto Rico was to be considered a state for
purposes of preemption.8 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that
Puerto Rico could not enact its own bankruptcy laws in order to
restructure the debt of its public utilities companies and any such laws
would be preempted by the Bankruptcy Code.
C.

A Promise

After the Supreme Court issued its decision, Congress was the last
resort for Puerto Rico." Representative Sean P. Duffy sponsored a bill
that was later called the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act.90 On June 30, 2016, President Obama signed
PROMESA into law,91 following several debates in Congress on
92
whether to approve, amend, or strike PROMESA. The Act's main
purpose is "to provide a method for a covered territory to achieve fiscal
responsibility and access to the capital markets." 93 Essentially,
PROMESA barred creditors from collecting debt until the board created
94
by PROMESA was organized.
In August 2016, President Obama appointed the members of
PROMESA's board.9 5 The board is composed of legislative leaders, a
87. The Supreme Court concluded as follows:
[T]he Code prevents Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek Chapter 9
relief Without that authorization, Puerto Rico's municipalities cannot qualify as Chapter
9 debtors.... But Puerto Rico remains a "State" for other purposes related to Chapter 9,
including that chapter's pre-emption provision. That provision bars Puerto Rico from
enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure the debt of its insolvent

public utilities companies.
Id. at 1942.
88. Id.
89. See Williams Walsh & Moyer, supra note 49.
90. H.R. 4900, 114th Cong. (2016).
91.

See Simon, supranote 76.

92. See Heather Long, PresidentObama Signs Puerto Rico Rescue Bill, CNN (June 30, 2016,
5:00 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/29/investing/puerto-rico-debt-promesa; Press Release,
Norma Torres, House to Vote on Torres Amendment Removing Minimum Wage Provision in
Puerto Rico Bill, (June 9, 2016), https://torres.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/house-votetorres-amendment-removing-minimum-wage-provision-puerto-rico.

93. See PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 101, 130 Stat. 549, 553 (2016) (codified at 48
U.S.C. § 2121).
94. See Rob Hotakainen, How Congressman Raul Labrador Made a Mark by Helping His
Homeland, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER (June 29, 2016, 6:42 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/

news/politics-govemment/article86738217.html#1 ("Creditors will be barred from using the courts
to collect money while the board gets organized and Puerto Rico restructures its more than $70
billion in debt.").
95. See President Obama Announces the Appointment of Seven Individuals to the Financial
Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, WHITE HoUSE (Aug. 31, 2016),
2

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 016/08/31/president-obama-announces-appointmentseven-individuals-financial (listing the appointed individuals to the Oversight and Management
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retired bankruptcy judge as well as other members with experience in
private equity and similar fields. 9 6 All members of the board share a
background in finance.97 The board acts as a federal check on the Puerto
Rican government.98 The Governor of Puerto Rico will continue to make
decisions but under the supervision and subject to the approval of the
board.9 9 The former Governor drafted and presented his fiscal plan to the
board in October 2016.'" However, the relationship between the
Governor and the board could change because the Island's current
Governor has implied opposition to PROMESA.' 0
Although PROMESA's main focus is on Puerto Rico's
management of public finances, this Note focuses on PROMESA's
minimum wage provision.102 Section 403 states that the Governor of
Puerto Rico may designate a period of time not to exceed four years in
which employers can pay a minimum wage of $4.25 to people under the
age of twenty-five.103 This provision is flawed.1" So far, Congress has

Board). The board has its own website where it publishes its events and documents. FIN.
OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., https://juntasupervision.pr.gov/index.php/en/home (last visited

Aug. 1, 2017).
96.

See Susan Cornwell & Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Appointed, REUTERS

(Aug.
31,
2016,
4:03
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-boardidUSKCNi 1628X (noting that one of the appointees, Carlos Garcia, was the former head of Puerto
Rico's Government Development Bank).
97. See Salim Furth, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Members Specialize in Finance, Not
Economic Reform, WALL ST. J.: WASHWIRE BLOG (Aug. 31, 2016, 3:07 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2016/08/3 1/puerto-rico-oversight-board-members-specialize-in-finance-not-economic-

reform (emphasizing that the appointed members of the board seem to demonstrate a background
geared toward finance "rather than economic reform").

98.

See Cornwell & Brown, supra note 96 ("[T]he board will be tasked with assessing and

certifying annual budgets and a fiscal recovery plan presented by the island's government, as well

as facilitating debt restructuring talks on the island . . . .").
99.

See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 65 ("Congress gave Puerto Rico's [G]ovemor, and not the

board, the authority to draft the 10-year fiscal plan that will become the basic road map for moving
Puerto Rico of its financial troubles.").
100.

See Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Oversight Board Hopes to Certify Fiscal Plan by End-Jan,

REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2016, 10:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-oversightidUSKBNI3DIL8.
101. See Luis J. Valentin, Rosselld Assures No Changes to Puerto Rico Minimum Wage,
CARIBBEAN Bus. (Jan. 9, 2017), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/rossello-assures-no-changes-topuerto-rico-minimum-wage (explaining that the new governor, Ricardo Rosell6, introduced
legislation related to labor reform that will not affect Puerto Rico's current minimum wage despite

the PROMESA).
102. See PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-(4),
(2016); infra Part III.
103. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-(4), 130 Stat. at 586.
104. See infra Part IV.A-C.
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denied recommendations to strike section 403.10o Employer adoption of
section 403 is forthcoming.o
D.

A Glance at the Legislative History of the FairLabor Standards
Act, Its Application to Puerto Rico, and Incorporationand
Amendments under the PROMESA

The FLSA is a federal law that establishes various requirements for
10 7
qualifying employers, such as the federal minimum wage.
Historically, the statutory minimum wage established by the FLSA
could be lower in U.S. territories than in the states."os In 1940, Congress
amended the FLSA to establish "special industry committees" that
would be in charge of determining the application of the minimum wage
in Puerto Rico.109 Further amendments expanded the scope of the FLSA
to cover retail 1 0 and allowed retail employers to hire full-time
students."' In 1996, Congress further amended the FLSA by creating a
youth subminimum wage.112
The youth subminimum wage that Congress included in the 1996
amended version of the FLSA allowed employers to pay a minimum
105. See Michael Oleaga, Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: PROMESA Bill Passes House,
Allows Provision Cutting Minimum Wage to $4.25 for Young Workers, LATIN POST
(June 10, 2016, 6:45 AM), http://www.latinpost.com/articles/121440/20160610/puerto-rico-debt(noting
crisis-promesa-bill-passes-house-and-cuts-minimum-wage-to-4-25-for-young-workers.htm
that Congresswoman Norma Torres suggested an amendment to strike the minimum wage provision
in its entirety). Torres's recommendation was rejected by vote of 225 to 196. Id.
106. See Valentin, supra note 101.
107. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206(a) (2012).
108. See History of Changes to the Minimum Wage Law, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/coverage.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) ("Early in the
administration of the FLSA, it became apparent that application of the statutory minimum wage was
likely to produce undesirable effects upon the economies of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands if
applied to all of their covered industries.").
109. See id (explaining that these special industry committees would "determine, and issue
through wage orders, the minimum wage levels applicable" and that the determined rates "could be
less than the statutory rates applicable elsewhere in the United States"). For a detailed discussion
about the history of the application of the FLSA to Puerto Rican jobs, see Alan B. Krueger, The
Effect of the Minimum Wage When It Really Bites: A Reexamination of the Evidence from Puerto
Rico 4-7 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4757).
110. See History of Changes to the Minimum Wage Law, supra note 108 (explaining that the
FLSA's amendments of 1961 significantly broadened the application and scope of the statutory
minimum wage to include areas such as retail and service establishments).
111. See id. (explaining that retail employers could employ "fulltime students at wages of no
more than 15 percent below the minimum with proper certification from the Department of Labor"
and further amendments extended the "fulltime student certification program to covered agricultural
employers and to institutions of higher learning").
112. Id. (noting that the 1996 amendments "established a youth sub minimum wage of $4.25
an hour for newly hired employees under the age 20 during their first 90 consecutive calendar days
after being hired by their employer").
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wage of $4.25 to employees who were twenty years old or younger."
One of the rationales for this youth subminimum wage is that younger
people tend to work for extra spending money.114 The FLSA's
subminimum wage provision applied to employers across the United
States and Puerto Rico."' There has been disagreement among
economists as to whether Puerto Rico should have the same minimum
wage as mainland United States.116 Covered jobs in Puerto Rico
continued to apply the federal minimum wage."
PROMESA amends the FLSA's youth subminimum wage
provision as applied to Puerto Rican employers."' The amendment
increases the age covered under the provision from twenty to twenty-five
years old.' 19 The original age stated in the FLSA, before the amendment,
was twenty years old-and it applied to all employers covered by the
FLSA irrespective of whether the employer was located in mainland
U.S. or Puerto Rico.120 The rationales that have supported the application
of a youth subminimum wage for employees under the age of twenty,
however, are not likely to be strong rationales for employees under the
age of twenty-five.121 The amendment also provides that the $4.25
subminimum wage can only be paid for the first ninety consecutive days
after an employee who is under the age of twenty-five is initially
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Cole Stangler, Youth Minimum Wage: Nebraska ConsidersLower Minimum Pay
Rate for Young Workers, INT'L Bus. TIMES (May 4, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
youth-minimum-wage-nebraska-considers-lower-minimum-pay-rate-young-workers-1907608
(suggesting that younger employees work for extra "spending money"). An annual study conducted
by the University of Michigan, based on the responses of about 49,000 high school seniors from the
classes of 1981 through 2011, found the following:
Most high school seniors spend most of their earnings on clothing, music, hobbies, and
leisure activities. Spending on cars comes in second, especially among males. Saving for
future education or contributing to help out family needs rank a good deal lower. Over
the last three decades there have been only modest changes in these uses of earnings. It
remains true that most high school students use the bulk of their earnings for
"discretionary" spending.
JERALD G. BACHMAN ET AL., WHAT Do TEENAGERS DO wITH THEIR EARNINGS, AND DOES IT

MATTER FOR THEIR ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT? iv (2014), http://
monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/occpapers/mtf-occ78.pdf; see also How Teen Workers Spend Their
Money: U-M Study Shows Trends, INST. FOR Soc. RES. U. MICH. (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://home.isr.umich.edu/releases/how-teen-workers-spend-their-money-um-study-shows-trends.
115. See History of Changes to the Minimum Wage Law, supra note 108.
116. See Krugman, supra note 48, at Al9.
117. See Oleaga, supra note 105 (noting that Puerto Rico currently applies a federal minimum
wage of $7.25 an hour).
118. See PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-(4), 130 Stat. 549, 586
(2016).
119. Id.
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(g)(1), (4) (2012).
121. See infra Part lI.A.
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employed. 122 PROMESA's amendment of the FLSA arguably broadens
the application of the subminimum wage and makes it applicable to any
123
job, except those listed in the exemptions section of the FLSA.
III.

LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A YOUTH
SUBMINIMUM WAGE

This Part describes the legal problems that PROMESA's youth
4
subminimum wage could potentially create in the future. 12 Allowing
employers to pay a subminimum wage to employees under the age of
125
twenty-five may trigger displacements of older employees.
PROMESA amends the FLSA; currently the FLSA regulations and
sanctions for employers that violate the prohibition on displacement are
likely to be inadequate. 12 6 Subpart B recognizes the plausible benefits of
a subminimum wage, but argues that the likely consequences outweigh
its benefits. 127 Subpart C argues that the youth subminimum wage may
encourage employers to displace older employees, resulting in age
discrimination.12 8 Subpart C further argues that it may be easier for
employers to terminate employees after the ninety-day subminimum
wage period is over by using probationary periods as a reason for
termination, since these periods can last up to nine months for private
129
It seems more likely that an
sector employers in Puerto Rico.
employer will abuse the subminimum wage so that the employer will
130
Finally, Subpart C
have more money to allocate to other costs.
recognizes that the FLSA prohibits an employer from displacing
employees who are subject to the youth subminimum wage, but argues
that these prohibitions need to be strengthened."

4
122. Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-( ), 130 Stat. at 586.
123. See id. (describing the amendment to the FLSA as applied to Puerto Rico, which fails to
provide any limitation on the types of jobs covered by the subminimum wage); see also 29 U.S.C.

§ 213.
124. See infra Part UI.A.
125. See Juan C. Ddvila, PROMESA: Puerto Rico's "Restructure" at $4.25 an Hour,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/juan-c-davila/promesa-puertoricos-rest b 10615610.html.
126. See infra Part
127. See infra Part 1.B.
128. See infra Part II.C.1.
129. See infra Part III.C.2.
130. See infra Part III.C.2.
131. See infra Part II.C.

U.C.
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Consequences ofPROMESA's Amendment to the FLSA

Allowing employers to enforce section 403 would trigger a
subminimum wage for people under the age of twenty-five. 3 2 As a
result, it may promote age discrimination and displacement of older
employees by employers who will want to hire at the subminimum wage
rate.1 33 A subminimum wage may encourage employers to hire a
"younger pool of labor." 134 Moreover, its application may continue to
increase economic instability in Puerto Rico. 135 It may continue to hinder
young adults who are part of a society where almost half of the
population already lives below the poverty line.1 36 Before the enactment
of PROMESA, a report published by Puerto Rico showed that its labor
participation significantly decreased. 137
The youth subminimum wage established by the FLSA, to the
extent it applies to jobs within the United States, only covers employees
who are twenty years old or younger. 13 8 For years, it has been suggested
that one of the rationales for the youth subminimum wage in the United
States is that young employees work for extra spending money. 13 9

132.

See PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403,

§ 2 06(g),

130 Stat. 549, 586 (2016);

Ddvila, supra note 125.

133.

See Ddvila, supranote 125.

134.

See Justin V61ez-Hagan, The Evidence for Lowering the Minimum Wage in Puerto Rico,

HILL (Apr. 19, 2016, 3:01 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/276704-the
-evidence-for-lowering-the-minimum-wage-in-puerto-rico (expressing concern about implementing
a subminimum wage in Puerto Rico that could "shift [employment] from the currently employed to
a younger pool of labor, instead of improving aggregate employment. Given the retracting
economy, it may be perfectly reasonable for an employer to say, 'hey, I can fire this guy and hire an

18 year old for way less').
135. See id. (comparing Puerto Rico to states in the United States by noting that a subminimum
wage in Puerto Rico can have a "counter-effect in Puerto Rico's labor mobility" because "a U.S.wide policy leaves employees nowhere else to go to find higher paying work," while Puerto Ricans
can leave the Island altogether).
136. See Brian Chappatta, Puerto Rico Economy Worsens with Crisis, Most Anywhere You

Look, BLOOMBERG: POL. (Apr. 25, 2016, 9:22 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/
articles/2016-04-25/puerto-rico-economy-worsens-with-crisis-most-anywhere-you-look (stating that
about 46.2% of the Puerto Rican population is currently living below the poverty line).
137.

See ANNE 0. KRUEGER ET AL., PUERTO Rico - A WAY FORWARD 6-7 (2015) (attributing

low labor participation to the fact that employees are "disinclined to take up jobs because the
welfare system provides generous benefits that often exceed what minimum wage employment

yields"). The total salary in the report was based on a minimum wage of $8.50 or less. Id. at 6; see
also Nick Timiraos, How the Puerto Rico Bill Attacks the Minimum Wage, WALL ST. J.: ECON.

BLOG (May 25, 2016, 8:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.comleconomics/2016/05/25/how-the-puerto-ricobill-attacks-the-minimum-wage (stating that in 2010, "[r]oughly one-third of workers earned the
minimum wage").

138. 29 U.S.C. § 206(g)(4) (2012); see U.S. DEP'T LABOR, Questions and Answers About the
Minimum Wage, https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/q-a.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (explaining
which enterprises are subject to the federal minimum wage).
139.

See BACHMAN ET AL., supranote 114, at 11-12. But see Stangler, supra note 114.
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However, this rationale may not be as applicable as applied to
individuals who are older than twenty years old.1 40 For example, many
individuals who are more than twenty years old are students, recent
graduates, or have families of their own with no external support.141 This
Note therefore argues that legislation needs to be enacted to add
exemptions to PROMESA for young adults who fall within these
categories.142 Raising the age of coverage under the youth minimum
wage may be a concession that Puerto Rican citizens must take;
however, it appears those risks may outweigh the benefits.1 43
Moreover, there has been tremendous opposition to PROMESA by
residents of the Island.'" Public resistance has been rapidly
increasing,1 45 and there is tension between government offices and
Puerto Rican citizens.146 It has also been predicted that opposition to
PROMESA might increase since Ricardo Rossell6, who is not a
supporter of PROMESA, was elected Governor. 147 In fact, Rosell6 has
created a committee that will be tasked with drafting recommendations
on legislation to increase the minimum wage for private employers.1 48
140. See Stangler, supra note 114 ("[Y]oung people aren't always just working for extra
spending money. . . .").
141. See Nelson Denis, Orwell in Puerto Rico: Congress 'Promises' a New Dictatorship,
NATION (Apr.
15, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/orwell-in-puerto-rico-congress-

promises-a-new-dictatorship (stating that many of the over 200,000 young adults in Puerto Rico are
currently paying student loans).

142.

See infra Part IV.B.

143. See infra Part Il.B.
144. See Jhoni Jackson, Young Boricuas Have Been Camped Out for a Month Protesting
PROMESA: Meet the Faces Behind the Movement, REMEZCLA (July 27,
2016,

5:43 PM), http://remezcla.com/features/culture/campamento-contra-la-junta-puerto-rico (describing
"Campamento Contra La Junta," a group composed of individuals who oppose the board established
by PROMESA, and its members who protested while living in tents outside the United States
District Court of Puerto Rico in San Juan for over a month).
145.

See Fiscal Board Protestors, Riot Police Clash on San Juan Bridge, CARIBBEAN Bus.

(Aug. 31, 2016), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/protestors-demonstrate-against-federal-fiscal-board
(describing the first protest against the board in Puerto Rico, which resulted in a clash between
officers from the Tactical Operations force and 300 activists); Yara Sim6n, As Soon as Obama
Signed PROMESA Budget Bill, Puerto Ricans Hit the Streets to Protest, REMEZCLA (June 30, 2016,
7:22 PM), http://remezcla.com/lists/culture/obama-signed-promesa-into-law.
146. See Fiscal Board Protestors, Riot Police Clash on San Juan Bridge, supra note 145

(noting that the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce filed a temporary restraining order against the
PROMESA protestors).
147. See Tom Howell Jr., Island Debt Package Faces Bipartisan Criticism, WASH. TIMES

(June 8, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/8/puerto-rico-debt-restructuringpackage-faces-bipar. Ricardo Rossell6 has been elected as the new Governor of Puerto Rico. See id.
(noting that Puerto Ricans might be "send[ing a] ... message" when Ricardo Rossell6 was elected
during the Island's primary election); see also Puerto Rico: Pro-Statehood Candidate Ricardo
Rosselld Wins Governor Race, NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:11 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/latino/puerto-rico-pro-statehood-candidate-ricardo-rossell-wins-governor-race-n680576.
148.

GobernadorFirma Orden Ejecutiva Para Aumentar Salario Minimo de Empleados del

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss4/12

16

Lugo-Sanchez: Do Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act as Applied to Puert

2017]

BENEFIT AT THE EXPENSE OF YOUNG WORKERS?

1325

Even members of the federal judiciary and local Puerto Rican politicians
have questioned PROMESA.14 9 Judge Juan R. Torruella encouraged
"peaceful 'civil resistance' to oppose the board."so Despite not always
being peaceful, there has indeed been resistance as protestors continue to
express their opposition to PROMESA and its board. 5"' These protestors
claim that their resistance against PROMESA is projected to
continue indefinitely. 152
In addition to the social resistance it has spurred, PROMESA may
also impact enterprises that are not covered by the FLSA.153 Title 29,
section 250(a) of the Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated ("section 250(a)")
addresses Puerto Rico's minimum wage.154 Section 250(a) provides the
legal protection of local enterprises not covered by federal law.155
Employers not covered by the FLSA are allowed to pay their employees
a minimum wage of approximately $5.08, which is 70% of the federal
minimum wage.156 If employers covered by the FLSA are allowed to pay
Gobierno [Governor Signs Order to Increase Minimum Wage of Government Employees],

MICRoJuRIS P.R. (Mar. 2, 2017), https://aldia.microjuris.com/2017/03/02/gobemador-firma-ordenejecutiva-para-aumentar-salario-minimo-de-empleados-del-gobiemo (stating that the committee will
have ninety days, from the day that the Governor signed the executive order, to create a plan on how

to implement legislation geared at increasing the minimum wage for the private sector). But see
PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 4, 130 Stat. 549, 551 (2016) (to be codified at 48 U.S.C.
§ 2103) ("The provisions of this Act shall prevail over any general or specific provisions of territory
law, State law, or regulation that is inconsistent with this Act.").
149. See Judge R. Torruella's Controversial Keynote Speech at the Puerto Rico Bar
Association Convention 2016, MICROJURIS P.R. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://aldia.microjuris.

com/2016/09/27/video-judge-juan-r-torruellas-controversial-keynote-speech-at-the-puerto-rico-barassociation-convention-2016-english-subtitles. When discussing his personal views on PROMESA,
he asked the rhetorical question "Promise of what, to whom? ... a seven-person 'Junta' politically
chosen by Congress and President Obama with omnipotent powers over the government

democratically elected by the People of Puerto Rico . . . ." Id; Ed Morales, The Technocratic
Takeover: Will the Eviscerationof Democracy in Puerto Rico Be Allowed to Proceed Unnoticed?,

JACOBIN MAG. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/puerto-rico-promesa-boardobama-trump (noting that local Puerto Rican politicians "have threatened to formally protest the
inclusion of the three most objectionable GOP appointees").

150. See Cindy Burgos Alvarado, Judge Torruella Calls for 'Economic Boycott' and 'Civil
Resistance'AgainstFiscal Board, CARIBBEAN Bus. (Sept. 11, 2016), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/

judge-torruella-requests-economic-boycott-and-civil-resistance-against-fiscal-board

(quoting Judge

Torruella when he suggested an economic boycott as a form of peaceful protest).

151. See, e.g., Cornwell & Brown, supra note 96.
152. See Jackson, supra note 144 (quoting protestors who claimed that "[t]heir stay, like the
federally imposed fiscal board they're protesting, is indefinite").
153. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 250(a) (2017).
154. Id.
155. Id. ("Those enterprises or activities that do not meet the criteria of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act, and are therefore exempted from the federal minimum wage, shall pay a minimum
wage equivalent to seventy percent ... of the prevailing minimum wage.").
156. Id. This number is the total of the federal minimum wage, which is $7.25, multiplied by
70%. See id; see also Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Jan. 1, 2017),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#Puerto.
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the youth subminimum wage of $4.25, then local enterprises not covered
by the FLSA could potentially pay a minimum wage equivalent to 70%
of this prevailing subminimum wage to people under the age of twentyfive.'1 7 This subminimum wage would be significantly less than what
employers not covered by the FLSA are currently allowed to pay to
employees who are twenty years or older."' Potentially, employers not
covered by the FLSA will now be able to pay a nuim um wage
of roughly $2.97.1"
In practice, this may become problematic since there is no explicit
language in either the FLSA or PROMESA's amendments addressing
sanctions against employers not covered by the FLSA, who might
displace employees in order to hire an individual at the calculated
subminimum wage. 60 Although Puerto Rican law includes a penalties
section, the FLSA should also include a penalty provision for employers
who violate the Puerto Rican law.' 6 ' Therefore, section 206(g)(2) of the
FLSA may also affect jobs that are not covered by federal minimum
wage laws.1 62 Despite congressional attempts to address the issue of
employee displacement by explicitly prohibiting it, the prohibition
seems too narrow.' 63 It appears as though Congress and Puerto Rico's
legislature failed to account for how amendments to the FLSA could
affect enterprises not covered by the FLSA.'" Legislation should be
enacted to include regulations and prohibitions against enterprises not
covered by the FLSA, but which must pay a minimum wage "equivalent
to seventy percent of the prevailing minimum wage." 6 1 If these
regulations and prohibitions are included within the amendments to the
157.

See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, supra note 156.

158. See supranotes 153-57; infra 159-60 and accompanying text.
159. This number is the total of the federal youth subminimum wage, as it applies to Puerto
Rico ($4.25), multiplied by 70%. See supranote 156 and accompanying text. It would be the lowest
state minimum wage followed by Georgia and Wyoming, both having a state minimum wage of
$5.15. See State Minimum Wages: 2017 Minimum Wage by State, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES

(Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx
#1.
160. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 215, 216 (2012); supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. See
generallyPROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, §§ 101, 402-04, 602, 130 Stat. 549, 553, 586-87, 609
(2016).
161. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 250(g) (2010) (providing that any person who violates any
provision of chapter 29 will be considered to have violated section g); infra Part IV.C. This can be
done by simply adding one subsection to the FLSA's penalties section. See infra note 271 and
accompanying text.

162. See State Minimum Wages: 2017 Minimum Wage by State, supra note 159 ("Employers
not covered by the FLSA will be subject to a minimum wage that is at least 70 percent of the
Federal minimum wage or the applicable mandatory decree rate of $5.08, whichever is higher.").
163. See infra Part IV.C.
164.

See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.

165.

See supranotes 153-60; infra Part IV.C.
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FLSA, then arguably a cause of action would arise out of PROMESA,
which would be covered by its jurisdictional section.166
B.

Benefits of a Subminimum Wage

The benefits of a lower minimum wage cannot be overlooked. 1 7
Before the enactment of PROMESA, the Puerto Rican government
drafted reports expressing concerns about the negative consequences that
would result when applying the United States minimum wage to Puerto
Rico.168 The main argument against imposing a higher minimum wage is
that it would cause a decrease in hiring, which would lead to a decrease
in labor participation. 16 9 However, this argument is not compelling
because the consequences of a lower subminimum wage outweigh
its benefits. 170
Currently, in Puerto Rico, a minimum wage earner earns about the
same as the median wage earner. 17 1 Moreover, several reports showed
that a minimum wage earner could potentially earn less than an
unemployed individual receiving federal assistance.17 2 Essentially, this
results in a disparity among minimum wage earners and unemployed
individuals. 173 This disparity may continue to increase if younger
workers are subject to a subminimum wage. 174 Even without these
considerations, Puerto Rico currently lacks strong labor participation.

166. PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 106, 130 Stat. 549, 562 (2016) (to be codified at 48
U.S.C. § 2126) ("[A]ny action ... otherwise arising out of this Act, in whole or in part, shall be
brought in a United States district court for the covered territory .....

167. See Krugman, supranote 48, at A19.
168. See id. (arguing that sharing the same minimum wage as in mainland United States would
increase costs and that a higher minimum wage would decrease productivity, which could be
attributed to the high amount of funding that Puerto Rico receives for federal programs and
outmigration).
169. See KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 137, at 6-7 (explaining that another factor that could

cause a decrease in hiring and labor participation would be that employees would be less motivated
to seek jobs because of the accessibility to welfare in Puerto Rico).
170. See id at 7 (comparing an estimate of incomes between a household of three people
receiving welfare, which could receive up to $1743 per month while a minimum wage earner could

receive up to $1159 per month).
171.

See Oren Cass, Help Wanted in Puerto Rico, A Proposalfrom Senator Marco Rubio

Could Revive the Island's Beleaguered Labor Market, CrrY J. (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.cityjournal.org/html/help-wanted-puerto-rico-14885.html (noting that a Puerto Rican minimum wage
earner can potentially earn significantly less than an individual receiving federal benefits and that
currently a minimum wage earner earns $7.25 per hour, while a median-wage earner earns $9.61 per

hour).
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
See infra Part 11.C.
See Cass, supra note 171.
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Thus, the plausible benefits of a subminimum wage are outweighed by
its consequences.' 76
C.

Lack of Regulation ofEmployers Who Might Displace
CurrentEmployees

PROMESA amends the FLSA's subsection regarding employers
who displace employees in order to hire others under the youth
subminimum wage."' The FLSA's section 206(g)(4) incorporates
section 215(a)(3) of PROMESA."' However, these sections do not
provide for any sanctions or penalties against employers who violate
them.179 In contrast, section 216 of the FLSA establishes various
penalties against employers who violate section 215 generally.so
Although section 216 establishes several penalties that must be enforced
against an employer who violates section 215(a)(3), these penalties are
inadequate."' They are flawed because section 215(a)(3) usually only
176. See infra Part If.C.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012); PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403,
§ 206(g)(2)-(4), 130 Stat. 549, 586 (2016).
178. PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-(4), 130 Stat. at 586 ("Any
employer who violates this subsection shall be considered to have violated section 15(a)(3).
The specific language of section 215(a)(3) is the following:
[T]o discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding
under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
179. See id. §§ 206, 215(a)(3).
180. The FLSA reads as follows:
(a) Fines and imprisonment. Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of
section 215 . .. shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than
$10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. No person shall be
imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense committed after the conviction of
such person for a prior offense under this subsection.
(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 15(a)(3) of this title shall be
liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes
of section 215(a)(3) ... including without limitation employment, reinstatement,
promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages. An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding
sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and
on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee
shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to
become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is
brought. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the
plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action.
Id. § 216(a)-(b).
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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applies to retaliation claims. 18 2 Moreover, section 216(a) creates criminal
penalties for employers, which imposes a heavy burden on an employee
seeking relief under such section.183 Providing a remedy for retaliation
claims is inadequate within the context of PROMESA's youth
subminimum wage.184 It is unlikely that every case will be retaliatory,
making it difficult for an employee in this situation to prove the elements
of a retaliation claim and obtain relief."'
Moreover, employers are likely to be encouraged to displace
employees, particularly older employees, in order to avoid having to
provide good cause for termination.186 Even though employers cannot
technically displace employees for purposes of hiring individuals at the
wage authorized,' 87 there are many employees who are unprotected by
section 403, especially those who are not unionized.' At this point, the
tangible implications of PROMESA's amendment to the FLSA are
unknown, but the various gaps in the law must be addressed.'
Subpart 1 discusses how the new youth subminimum wage may
encourage employers to displace or terminate older employeeS.190 it also
examines current prohibitions against these displacements and argues
that they are insufficient.191 Subpart 2 considers the overlap between
probationary periods and the amount of time that employers may be
allowed to pay the subminimum wage to employees who are initially
employed.' 92 Subpart 2 also considers how employers inight take
advantage of probationary periods to avoid providing good cause
for termination.1 9 3

182. Most of the cases involving section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA are cases involving retaliation
claims. See, e.g., Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., 121 F.3d 1390, 1393-94, 1398-99 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that in the context of a claim for retaliation under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), plaintiff failed to
produce sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment); Cordero v. Turabo Med.
Ctr. P'ship, 175 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127-28 (D.P.R. 2001) (holding that a claim for retaliation under 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) must show that the employee engaged in a protected activity).
183. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (requiring an individual who violates the subsection to act
willfully and imposing a fine, imprisonment, or both).
184. See infra Part IV.C.
185. See infra Part V.C. This is particularly true when considering that employers may fire
employees while on probationary periods. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
186. See Divila, supranote 125.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 4 ("No one knows yet how intrusive federal oversight will
be.").
190. See infra Part I.C.1.
191. See infra Partll.C.1.
192. See infra Part III.C.2.
193. See infra Part l.C.2.
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1. Discrimination Based on Age
Enforcement of this subminimum wage may promote age
discrimination. 194 It seems evident that employers will benefit
economically if they can pay lower wages to people under the age of
twenty-five, as opposed to having to pay the regular minimum wage to
older employees. 195 Thus, regulations and sanctions against employers
need to be strengthened. 196 Although PROMESA's amendments to the
FLSA also incorporate provisions that prohibit employers from
displacing employees, employers can circumvent these prohibitions
when displacing older workers. 197 It will not be difficult for Puerto Rican
employers to displace older employees and justify their decisions to do
so based on economic reasons. 198
This Note recognizes that there are safeguards under Puerto Rican
local laws to prevent this issue.19 Section 185(c) of the Puerto Rico
Laws Annotated provides, in relevant part, that when an employer
discharges an employee because of reduction in profits or reorganization
then the following duty attaches:
[I]t shall be the duty of the employer to retain those employees of
greater seniority on the job with preference, provided there are
positions vacant or filled by employees of less seniority in the job
within their occupational classification which may be held by them, it
being understood that preference shall be given to the employees
discharged in the event that within the six (6) months following their
layoff the employer needs to employ a person in like or similar work to

194. See Ddvila, supra note 125 (suggesting that the subminimum wage might impact older
employees).
195. See id.
196. See id. (suggesting that it will be simple for employers to get around displacing
employees).
197. Cases from various states demonstrate that employers could proffer reasons, in the context
of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claims, as to why older employees were
terminated. See, e.g., Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1986) (affirming the lower
court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the employer, and finding that the employer
did not discriminate when it laid off an older employee for economic reasons because the employer
also laid off another employee who was younger and was paid more than plaintiff); Duncan v. El
Paso Prod. Co., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13423, at *3-4 (Tex. Nov. 27, 1985) (holding that economic
necessity was a reasonable factor other than age to lay off an ADEA plaintiff). Employers may also
displace or terminate younger employees simply by stating that they have not been successful
during their probationary periods. See infra notes 210, 276 and accompanying text. This argument is
strengthened by the fact that probationary periods in Puerto Rico can last up to nine months. See

infra notes 210, 276 and accompanying text.
198. See Divila, supranote 125; infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
199. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185c (1985).
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that which said employees were doing at the time of their discharge,
within their occupational classification . 200
In 1996, the First Circuit clarified this provision in Pages-Cahuev.
Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espahia.2 01' Even with the safeguards provided
by Puerto Rican laws, the Court in Pages-Cahue agreed with other
circuits that when an employer is reducing its labor force, it is not
obligated to offer any transfers or relocations.202 Thus, if employers find
an economic reason or argue that they are reducing their labor force,
then they may displace older employees and unfairly benefit from the
youth subminimum wage. 203 Therefore, this Note proposes enacting
legislation that strengthens regulation of employers, and creates
exemptions to PROMESA's amendment to the FLSA. 2 0
2. First Ninety Consecutive Days: A Reasonable Time or an
Escape Hatch for Employers?
Employers might avoid terminating employees since it is often
undesirable to have a high turnover rate.205 One of the primary reasons
employers are likely to avoid turnover is the high cost associated with
finding a replacement.206 However, this argument is inapplicable when
dealing with employers covered by PROMESA.207 The argument
particularly fails when the recent extension of probationary periods in
Puerto Rico is considered. 208 The application of the youth subminimum
wage during the first ninety consecutive days of an employee's
employment is likely to clash with probationary periods. 209 It is

200. Id.
201. 82 F.3d 533, 540 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that the provision was subject to two other
provisions that stated the following: "seniority need not be followed where 'there is a clear and
conclusive difference in favor of the efficiency or capacity of the workers compared' and the other

provision related specifically to an employer who had multiple offices operating independently).
202. See id. at 539 (stating that employers who are "conducting a reduction in force face no
obligation to offer 'lower echelon, poorer paying jobs in the restructured enterprise' to all older
employees").
203. See id. at 539-40; Divila, supranote 125.
204. See infra Part IV.
205. See, e.g., How to Reduce Employee Turnover, WALL ST. J., http://guides.wsj.com/
management/recruiting-hiring-and-firing/how-to-reduce-employee-turnover (last visited Aug. 1,

2017) (explaining that generally it costs employers double the amount of an employee's salary to
replace her position).
206. See id.
207.

See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.

208. See infra notes 211-13, 277-79 and accompanying text.
209. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185h (1998); see also Mariela Rexach et al., Puerto Rico
Approves Major Reform oflts Employment Laws, LITTLER (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.littler.com/

publication-press/publication/puerto-rico-approves-major-reform-its-employment-laws (stating that
probationary periods can last up to nine months for all other employees that are not executives).
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imperative to implement sanctions in order to regulate employers who
may try to put employees that qualify for the subminimum wage on
probationary periods, since these periods have been recently changed to
last up to nine months.2 10 With longer probationary periods, employers
are able to displace employees after the ninety days of the subminimum
wage are over, without having to show good cause. 2 1' This provides an
easy way for employers to terminate employees for an alleged
unsuccessful probationary period and thus avoid having to provide good
cause. 2 12 Employees in probationary periods need to be protected by
regulations directed at employers who try to displace them after the
probationary period is over.213
IV.

A CALL FOR AN

AMENDMENT

Congress should amend the provision prohibiting displacement of
employees so that it accounts for the negative effects that the youth
subminimum wage will create. 214 This Part analyzes PROMESA's
legislative history, which demonstrates a strong intent against the
enactment of section 403.215 Subpart A examines post-enactment
proposals that go against PROMESA's wage provision, which also
demonstrate strong opposition to the provision. 2 16 Additionally, this
Subpart argues that it is likely that Congress might adopt other proposed
amendments to section 403.217 Subpart B proposes amendments to
section 206(g)(2) of the FLSA-amended by section 403--explains why
amendments are necessary, and specifies which employers should be
covered by the amendments.2 18 Subpart B also suggests the inclusion of
exemptions to the current law, which would exempt individuals who
have dependents or who are pursuing higher education.2 19 Alternatively,
Subpart C recommends various amendments to broaden the scope
of current penalties by suggesting a list of specific violations, and
210. See Rexach et al., supra note 209; see also House Approves Labor Reform Amid
Controversy, CARIBBEAN BUS. (Jan. 14, 2017), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/house-approves-labor-

reform-amid-controversy (explaining the effects of Puerto Rico's newly enacted labor reform,
which includes an increase in the length of probationary periods to up to nine months).
211. See infra Part IV.C.
212. See infra Part IV.C.
213. See Divila, supra note 125 (foreseeing violations against PROMESA's limited restriction
on displacement by employers and stating that soon "there will be a job opening starting
immediately at $4.25 an hour"); infra Part IV.C.
214. See infra Part IV.C.
215. See infra Part IV.A.
216. See infra Part IA.
217. See infra Part IV.A.
218. See infra Part IV.B.
219. See infra Part IV.B.
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different degrees of penalties that account for the first offense and
ongoing offenses.220
A.

Legislative History and Other ProposedSolutions Demonstrate
Strong Sentiment Against the Enactment ofSection 403

Although PROMESA's main purpose is to aid Puerto Rico in
achieving fiscal responsibility, it also contains a provision related to the
federal minimum wage. 221 This Note's solution includes, among other
recommendations, a closer look at the legislative history of
PROMESA.222 The legislative history demonstrates that many members
of Congress opposed the bill during debates, while other members
proposed amendments to strike section 403 in its entirety.22 3 Even
members of Congress who supported PROMESA did so with outspoken
opposition to the youth subminimum wage provision.224 PROMESA was
enacted in order to aid Puerto Rican municipalities to balance their
debt-not to regulate labor.225
Newly proposed legislation further demonstrates disagreement with
the way that section 403 is currently drafted.226 In December 2016, U.S.
Senator Marco Rubio introduced legislation called the Economic
Mobility for Productive Livelihoods and Expanding Opportunity Act of
2016 ("EMPLEO"). 227 EMPLEO, Spanish for job, seeks to amend
subsection 206(a) of the FLSA, which is the same section-but different
subsection-that PROMESA currently amends. 2 28 Rubio proposes an
220. See infra Part IV.C.
221.

See supra Part III.

222. See infra notes 223-35 and accompanying text.
223. See H.R REP. No. 114-602, pt. 1, at 117-18 (2016); Press Release, Norma Torres, supra
note 92; Patricia Guadalupe, Here's How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico's Debt, NBC
NEWS (June 30, 2016, 1:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-how-promesa-aims-

tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741.
224. See, e.g., Guadalupe, supra note 223 (quoting Representative Nydia Veldzquez's
opposition to PROMESA's labor provisions "Am I angry that the bill contains labor provisions that
are not only obnoxious, but counterintuitive? Yes"). Representative Raul Labrador, who took part in
drafting PROMESA, stated the following: "I don't like it but it was something that was
necessary...." Id; see Linda Scnchez Statement on Puerto Rico, (June 9, 2016),
https://lindasanchez.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/linda-s-nchez-statement-puerto-rico

(noting that Congresswoman Linda SAnchez supported PROMESA as a way of providing Puerto
Rico relief from its financial crisis although she disagreed "with the bill's language on minimum
wage, overtime protection, and earned retirement pension benefits").

225. PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, § 101, 130 Stat. 549, 553 (2016) (to be codified at 48
U.S.C. § 2121).
226. See Economic Mobility for Productive Livelihoods and Expanding Opportunity Act, S.
3503, 114th Cong. (2016).
227. See id.
228. See id
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"opt-in" program in which employers who join will be able to pay a
minimum wage of five dollars.229 In theory, Rubio's prediction is that
employers will be motivated to "opt-in" because paying a five-dollar
230
minimum wage will allow them to allocate funds to other costs. The
proposed legislation aims to create a win-win situation for both
employer and employee. 2 3 1 Employees working for employers that
participate in the "opt-in" program will qualify to receive a wage
subsidy.2 32 However, only employees who earn less than ten dollars per
hour are eligible for this wage subsidy. 23 3 Although Rubio's proposal
also advocates for a subminimum wage-although not for young
workers-it acknowledges that PROMESA's subminimum wage is
below the threshold of sustainability. 234 This Note supports portions
of Rubio's legislation by adopting, to a certain extent, some of
its proposals.235
B. Amendments to Section 403
Members of Congress and Puerto Ricans alike have opposed
section 403.236 Currently, Puerto Rico's labor participation rate is
worrisome.23 Allowing a subminimum wage for younger employees
238
If
will likely result in legal and social consequences for Puerto Rico.
the youth subminimum wage is enforced, the labor force participation
will continue to decrease because employees have little incentive to
239
work, since living off of welfare pays more than the current wages. By
2050, the Puerto Rican population is expected to drop by thousands of
citizens.
229.

24 0

Employers who are subject to the federal minimum wage will

See Kevin Derby, Marco Rubio Brings Back EMPLEO Act to Help Puerto Rico's

Economy, SUNSHINE ST. NEWS (Jan. 6, 2017, 1:15 PM), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/

bill
the
(explaining
story/marco-rubio-brings-back-empleo-act-help-puerto-ricos-economy
introduced by Senator Marco Rubio).
230. See id.
231. This win-win scenario is implied in the goals of the bill, which states, "[a] bill [t]o
decrease the cost of hiring, and increase the take-home pay of, Puerto Rican workers." See S. 3503.
232. See Derby, supra note 229 (defining a wage subsidy as a raise of up to $2.50 for
employees who earn less than ten dollars per hour only if her employer opted-in).
233. See id.
234. See S. 3503.
235. See infra Part IV.C (using some of Rubio's proposal as a model to draft a solution).
236.
237.

See supra Part W.A.
See Labor ParticipationRate Rises 1.1% for July, Estimated at 40.5%, CARIBBEAN BUS.

(Aug. 19, 2016), http://caribbeanbusiness.com/labor-participation-rate-rises-1-1-for-july-estimatedat-40-5; supra notes 137, 169 and accompanying text.
238. See Walsh, supra note 65, at B3 (noting that the ex-Govemor of Puerto Rico referred to
the current situation in the Island as an "economic and humanitarian crisis"); supra Part il.A.

239. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
240.

See InternationalData Base, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/
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likely benefit from the youth subminimum wage. 24 1 Enforcing the
youth subminimum wage may continue to promote emigration of
young adults.242
The current minimum wage is approximately "77 percent of the
median wage." 2 43 Enforcing a youth subminimum wage is likely to
decrease their participation in the labor market. 2" As it is currently
drafted, employers who are subject to the FLSA will be able to adopt the
subminimum wage, subject to the Governor's approval. 2 45 Employers
may now be implicitly allowed to hire younger employees at the youth
subminimum wage while at the same time leaving these younger
employees with little to no safeguards. 246 The amendments do not offer
an explicit list of jobs that will be affected by the new subminimum
wage.24 7 Section 403's amendment to section 206(g)(2) refers to
"employers" as opposed to "any employers." 24 8 The amendment does
intemational/data/idb/region.php?N=%20Results%20&T=13&A=separate&RT=0&Y=2026,2027,2
028,2029,2030,2031,2032,2033,2034,2035,2036,2037,2038,2039,2040,2041,2042,2043,2044,2045,
2046,2047,2048,2049,2050&R=-1&C=RQ (last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
241. See DAvila, supra note 125 (suggesting that PROMESA will deregulate labor by
encouraging employers to "hire less full-time workers and young workers need to conform with

only working 15 to 35 hours a week with no benefits").
242. See Alvarez, supra note 9, at 22.
243. See Scott Beyer, Puerto Rico's Business Climate Problem, FORBES (May 10, 2016, 5:31
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2016/05/10/puerto-ricos-business-climate-problem/

#34707f8f2045 (noting that the current minimum wage is $7.25 and that the minimum wage in most
states "is between 40 percent and 50 percent of the median"); Doar, supra note 7.
244. However, it can be argued that decreasing the minimum wage applicable in Puerto Rico

will be beneficial, as it has been previously shown that having the same minimum wage as the
United States has decreased Puerto Rico's labor participation. Doar, supra note 7 (citing a 1990s

study that showed that Puerto Rican labor participation decreased about 10% when the same
minimum wage as that imposed in the United States was applied to Puerto Rican jobs). But see

Oleaga, supra note 105 ("Lowering wages will only compel more young people to leave and will
have a detrimental impact on Puerto Rico's current and future workforce, its tax base, and

ultimately its ability to repay its debt.").
245. See Juan Felipe Santos & Jeffrey W. Brecher, Puerto Rico Does Not Have to Comply with
DOL's FinalRule Amending 'White Collar' Overtime Regulations,for Now, JACKSON LEWIS (June

30, 2016), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/puerto-rico-does-not-have-comply-dol-s-finalrule-amending-white-collar-overtime-regulations-now (explaining how PROMESA changes the
applicability of the FLSA to jobs in Puerto Rico). After the 2016 election, the new Governor of
Puerto Rico has released legislation regarding labor reform and has stated that he will not change
the federal minimum wage despite PROMESA's changes. See Valentin, supra note 101. But see

PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, §4, 130 Stat. 549, 551 (2016) (to be codified at 48 U.S.C.
§ 2103) ("The provisions of this Act shall prevail over any general or specific provisions of territory
law, State law, or regulation that is inconsistent with this Act.").

246. See Ddvila, supra note 125 (suggesting this type of behavior from employers).
247. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)4), 130 Stat. at 586 (listing PROMESA's
amendments to the FLSA without specifying the jobs affected by the amendment).
248. The amended language introduced by PROMESA is the following:
In lieu of the rate prescribed by subsection (a)(1), the Governor of Puerto
Rico, subject to the approval of the Financial Oversight and Management Board
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not provide a specific reference to particular employers to whom the
provision will apply.2 4 9 However, section 206(g)(2) is to work in lieu of
section 206(a)(1) when applied to Puerto Rico, but only with regard to
the rate prescribed.2 50 Since the language of section 206(g)(2)
incorporates the language of section 206(g)(1) and how it is to be
applied to Puerto Rico, it can be inferred that section 206(g)(2) applies
to any employer beyond those listed in the first subsection of section
206.251 It seems as though the addition of the words "any employer"25 2
broadens the law by making it applicable to jobs other than those
involving commerce and goods.253
Legislation should be enacted to narrow the scope of application of
section 206(g)(2) and to establish definite regulations and sanctions for
employers who violate this section.2 54 In general, section 206(g)(2) of
the FLSA is amended by section 403.255 Because section 206(g)(2) can
arguably apply to any employer, the subsection should be amended so as

established pursuant to section 101 of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act, may designate a time period not to exceed four years
during which employers in Puerto Rico may pay employees who are initially
employed after the date of enactment of such Act a wage which is not less than the
wage described in paragraph (1). Notwithstanding the time period designated, such
wage shall not continue in effect after such Board terminates in accordance with
section 209 of such Act.
Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2), 130 Stat. at 586.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. Section 206(a) provides a list of the employers to whom this minimum wage applies and
states the following:

Employees engaged in commerce; home workers in Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands;
employees in American Samoa; seamen on American vessels; agricultural employees.
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce ....

29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2012).
252. Section 206(g)(2) of the FLSA, amended by PROMESA, incorporates section 206(g)(1).
See infra note 254 and accompanying text. The language of section 206(g)(1) is the following:
In lieu of the rate prescribed by subsection (a)(1), any employer may pay any employee
of such employer, during the first 90 consecutive calendar days after such employee is
initially employed by such employer, a wage which is not less than $4.25 an hour.
Id. § 206(g)(1).
253. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text; infra notes 254-56 and accompanying
text. The word "any" is limited in scope by the listed exemptions. See 29 U.S.C. § 213.
4
254. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-( ), 130 Stat. 549, 586 (2016); supra Part
1.C. Legislation may be useful to narrow the language of the provision by specifying how an
employer violates the provision as well as establishing monetary penalties against employers who
unfairly benefit from the youth subminimum wage. See infra Part IV.C. These sanctions may prove
more efficient than requiring an employee to show that her employer acted "willfully." See infra
notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
255. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)--(4), 130 Stat. at 586.
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to narrow its application to jobs involving commerce or production of
goods for commerce. 25 6 The following is the proposed subsection for an
amendment of the FLSA's section 206(g)(2):
(g) Newly hiredemployees who are less than 20 years old.
(2) In lieu of the rate prescribed by subsection (a)(1), only employers
engaged in commerce or in the production of goodsfor commerce may
pay any employee of such employer, during the first 30 consecutive
calendar days after such employee is initially employed by such
employer, a wage which is not less than $4.25 an hour.257

The amendment would narrow the language of the subsection so
that only certain employers-those involved in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce-may adopt the $4.25 subminimum
251
wage.28 It would also shorten the time for this minimum wage from
ninety days to thirty days. 259 Alternatively, the provision should remain

as it is currently drafted, but it should include exemptions. 260 The
exemptions should apply to individuals who are under the age of twentyfive, and are pursuing higher education, paying student loans, or who
have dependents. 261 This solution can be adopted by simply including
the following subsection:
(2)(a) Employees within the following categories must be exempted

from the subminimum wage:
(i) individuals who are twenty-five years old or younger with
dependents;
(ii) individuals who are twenty-five years old or younger and who
are pursuing higher education on a full-time orpart-time basis and
who are at leastfifty percent dependent on their own income; or

256. See infra note 257 and accompanying text. Each subsection of section 206 addresses a
specific employer, which seems as if the employers listed in subsection (a) are not applicable to all
the subsections within section 206. Thus, arguably subsection 206(g)(2) may apply to any
employee. See Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-(4), 130 Stat. at 586.
257. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2012); Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-(4), 130
Stat. at 586; supra Part III.C.
258. See supranote 257 and accompanying text.
259. See supranote 257 and accompanying text.
260. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
261. See Dvila, supra note 125 (acknowledging that PROMESA's youth subminimum wage
does not take into account individuals under the age of twenty-five who financially support their
families and those who are college students); Rende Loth, Close the 'Subminimum' Wage Loophole,
BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2017/03/03/close-subminimumwage-loophole-close-subminimum-wage-loophole/peorwmYduzUKyGVxiq5ZFN/story.html;
Stangler, supra note 114 (drawing from Nebraska legislation that "would exempt people who are
under 18 and do not have high school diplomas or child dependents from the new wage law").
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(iii) individuals who are twenty-five years old or younger and who
arepaying student loans.262
This alternative takes into account the theory that young workers
tend to work for spending money, which is not the case for those in the
categories listed above.263 Moreover, the exemption will also provide a
2
less stringent application of the youth subminimum wage. 6 It is also
less likely to negatively affect labor participation.2 65 Although there are
no guarantees that these exemptions will be successful, they will likely
reduce any legal claims arising from the application of the youth
subminimum wage.266
C. Legislation Should Be Enacted to Strengthen Sanctionsfor
Employers Who Displace or Act Less FavorablyAgainst Employees
After the Subminimum Wage PeriodIs Over
In order to avoid displacement of employees after the probationary
period or after the subminimum wage period is over, regulations and
penalties should be strengthened. 26 7 As it is currently drafted,
PROMESA states that employers may not take any action to displace
employees, and if an employer does displace an employee, then the
employer will be deemed to have violated section 215(a)(3) of the
FLSA. 268 However, PROMESA seems to incorporate penalties that are
only triggered in the context of retaliation claims. 269 Thus, this Note
proposes a broader approach to the penalties that are to be applied
against an employer who violates section 403 or the FLSA's section
206(g)(2)-(4), as amended.27 0

262. See Divila, supra note 125. For the purposes of this Note, the general definition of
dependent is as follows:
A qualifying child or a qualifying relative. Five tests must be met for a child to be [a]
qualifying child. The fives tests are: [relationship, age, residency, support, and joint
return]. Four tests must be met for a person to be [a] qualifying relative. The four tests
are: [not a qualifying child test, member of household or relationship test, gross income
test, and support test].
Personal Exemptions and Dependents, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/publications/pl7/chO3.html#
enUS_2016_publinklOO0170933 (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). For a more in depth definition of who
qualifies as a dependent see id
263. See Ddvila, supra note 125; Stangler, supra note 114.
264. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
266. See supranote 262 and accompanying text.
267. See supraPart m.C.
268. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012); Pub. L. No. 114-187, sec. 403, § 206(g)(2)-(4), 130
Stat. 549, 586 (2016).
269. See supranote 182 and accompanying text.
270. See infra note 271 and accompanying text. Legislation may be useful to identify when an
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To ensure that employers who displace employees to unfairly take
advantage of the youth subminimum wage, discriminate, or retaliate are
punished, the provision should also include the following subsection:
4. Any employer who violates section 403 of the Puerto Rico
Oversight,. Management, and Economic Stability Act or section
206(g) (2) of the FairLabor StandardsAct, as amended by PROMESA,
shall be liablefor such legal or equitable reliefas may be appropriate
including, but not limited to, employment, reinstatement, promotion,
and the payment of wages lost.
(a) An employer violates the sections above if
(1) the employer displaces, terminates, demotes, or otherwise
adversely affects the terms of employment of any employee in
order to unfairly benefitfrom the youth subminimum wage;
(2) shapes its hiringpolicies in a way that it unfairly benefitsfrom
the youth subminimum wage; or
(3) terminates an employee after the ninety days period without
providing good cause, in writing, for the termination.
(b) If an employer is found to have violated these provisions the
following additionalpenalties apply:
(1) if it is the first violation, a fee in the amount of $500 shall be
paid to the Secretary ofState; or
(2) if it is not the first violation, a fee in the amount of $1000 shall
be paid to the Secretary of State.
(c) This section also applies to enterprises not covered by the Fair
Labor StandardsAct, as referenced in section 250(a) of the Title 29 of
the Laws ofPuerto Rico Annotated.271

This provision incorporates similar language from the current
penalties provision of the FLSA, but includes several protections that
would be appropriate and would only apply in the context discussed in
this Note.272 Moreover, even if the only other applicable penalties
provided in section 216(a) were to be applied, these penalties are still
ineffective because of their high burden requiring an employee to show
"willfulness." 273 It may be difficult for an employee to prove that the
actions of her employer were willful. 2 74 Thus, this standard should be
relaxed so that employees can readily show that employers displaced
employer is violating the law, to provide specific penalties to be afforded to an employee
challenging her employer's practices, and to draw a clear distinction between first and second time
offenders. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
271. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), (b), 216(b); Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. at 586; Empleo
Act, S. 3503, 114th Cong. §§ (d)(2), (o) (2016); infra note 280 and accompanying text.
272. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); supra note 271 and accompanying text; infra note 280 and
accompanying text.

273.
274.

See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a).
This section imposes criminal sanctions. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2017

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 12

1340

HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 45:1309

them for reasons related to the unfair application of the youth
subminimum wage by simply striking the word "willfully." 27 5 This will

broaden the scope of application of the penalties under section 216 of
the FLSA.276
It is imperative to introduce sanctions that account for employers
who try to put employees that qualify for the subminimum wage on
probationary periods, since these periods have been recently changed to
last up to nine months-in the private sector.277 Now, probationary
periods exceed the period that employers are allowed to adopt the youth
subminimum wage. 278 Thus, there is a greater incentive for employers to
displace employees soon after the ninety days of the subminimum wage
are over without having to provide good cause. 279 That is why this Note
aims to decrease the number of employers who may attempt to unfairly
benefit from the subminimum wage by suggesting stronger penalties for
employers who displace employees subject to the subminimum wage
and by requiring employers to offer good cause in writing. 28 0 Thus,
another regulation should require employers to provide written notice to
employees giving a detailed account of the employee's conduct and
actions that led to the termination of her probationary period,
particularly if the employer experiences high turnover rates. 28 1 At the
very least, employers should be required to evaluate individuals within
the first thirty days of employment as opposed to waiting the full ninety
days, when probationary periods are not nearly over.2 82

2 7 5. Id.
276. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
277. In 2017, the newly elected Governor of Puerto Rico introduced a labor reform that
changed the length of probationary periods, which could last up to three months, and now can last
up to twelve months. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185(h) (1998); see also CARIBBEAN Bus., supra
note 210 (explaining the effects of Puerto Rico's newly enacted labor reform, which include an
increase in the length of probationary periods).
278. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Part III.C.2.
280. SeesupraPartIV.
281. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 31, § 34 (2012) (outlining a Massachusetts law that
recommends that when employer's end an employee's probationary period the employer may "give
such person a written notice to that effect, stating in detail the particulars wherein his conduct or
capacity or the character or quality of his work is not satisfactory"). Legislation may be useful to
create an effective regulatory system for employer's who try to displace employees in order to
unfairly benefit from the submininum wage. See Ddvila, supra note 125; supra note 271 and
accompanying text.
282. See Nancy Yaffe, Given California's Version of the ACA, Should ProbationBe 60 or 90
Days?, Fox ROTHSCHILD LLP (Dec. 17, 2014), https://califomiaemploymentlaw.foxrothschild.
com/tags/probationary-period (suggesting a similar solution to apply to employers in California in
the context of providing new hires with healthcare benefits by evaluating them "within the first 30
days, rather than waiting a full 60 or 90 days").
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CONCLUSION

The economic crisis in Puerto Rico has reached a peak that will
take many years to stabilize. 28 3 As a consequence, the labor force has
faced a staggering decline.284 The enactment of PROMESA was aimed
at aiding the Puerto Rican government in managing its debt.285 But the
minimum wage provision included in PROMESA creating a lower youth
subminimum wage goes beyond this aid. 286 Many citizens of Puerto Rico
and members of Congress strongly disagree with the application of the
youth subminimum wage. 287 It has been predicted that the Island's
population will continue to decrease, which in turn will continue to
negatively affect the labor force and prospects for economic recovery.288
PROMESA amends the FLSA youth subminimum wage as it applies to
Puerto Rico. 289 Moreover, the penalties afforded in case of an employer
violation are too narrow. 290 Without regulations that apply in this
particular context, it will be fairly easy for employers to displace
employees in order to hire younger employees at the subminimum
wage.291 If all that an employer needs to do to take advantage of the
subminimum wage is find legal avenues to displace current employees,
then the prohibition against displacement fails.292 Therefore, Congress
should enact legislation that amends this provision by narrowing its
language and scope of application.293 Understanding the benefits of
section 403, this Note provides an alternative approach and suggests that
exemptions be added to the law, as it is currently drafted.294 These
exemptions would exclude individuals who are twenty-five years old or
younger with dependents and those pursuing higher education.295
Congress should also enact legislation, as that proposed herein, that
establishes penalties that are specifically for employees who attempt to

283. See supra Part I.
284. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
285.
286.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part H.

287.
288.
289.

See supra Parts I.A, IVA.
See supra notes 137, 241 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.
290. See supra Part I.C.
291. See Divila, supra note 125 (suggesting that notwithstanding PROMESA's restriction on
employer's displacement of employees in order to hire younger individuals at the subminimum
wage "it is easy for an employer to do exactly that, they just need to find ways around the legality of
their intentions").
292. See id.; supranotes 197-99 and accompanying text.
293. See supranote 257 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part IV.B-C.
295. See supra Part IV.B.
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or take advantage of the youth subminimum wage. 2 96 This legislation
would broaden the scope of application of these penalties to more than
solely retaliation claims.297 Alternatively, the language in the current
penalties should be struck, which would broaden its scope.298 Lastly, this
Note suggests imposing the requirement of written notice with a detailed
account of an employee's conduct and actions that led to the termination
of her probationary period. 29 9 These solutions have been proposed in the
hopes that amendments to PROMESA will be adopted so that Puerto
Rican people who are under the age of twenty-five do not have to live as
a sub-class and the older generations do not have to fear displacement.3 0
Jeruska Lugo-Sdnchez*

296.

See supra Part IV.C.

297.
298.
299.

See supra Part IV.C.
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